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1 Introduction
When looking for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium or for core-Walras equivalence results,
one of the major problems in dealing with models with an infinite dimensional commodity space
is the possible emptiness of the order cone. Unfortunately, this prevents the use of classical
separation arguments for proving the existence of prices which support Walrasian allocations in
many of the spaces that are of interest for economic and financial models such as, for example, the
Lp spaces, p ∈ [1,∞). Therefore, conditions which can amend this difficulty have been extensively
studied, the most popular ones used in models with individual agents and preferences being the
cone condition of Chichilnisky and Kalman (1980), the properness of Mas-Colell (1986) and the
extremely desirable commodity of Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) (these three conditions prove
∗corresponding author
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to be equivalent for complete preorders, see Chichilnisky, 1993). We refer the reader also to
Aliprantis at al. (2000) for a complete overview on the topic.
Starting from Aumann’s work (1964), the idea that when an economy has sufficiently many traders
everyone acts like a price-taker and only coalitions matter, has been formalized through the
assumption of a space of negligible agents, each endowed with individual preferences on bundles
of commodities. More precisely, both in the case of a finite and an infinite dimensional commodity
space, the primitives in these models are a measure space of agents, a σ-algebra on the space (where
each element represents a coalition), and a nonatomic measure. Clearly, if the nonatomic measure
is non trivial, this implies that the space is uncountable. In other words, in a countably additive
setting the space of agents has to be uncountable. To overcome this lack of realism and of economic
meaningfulness, many authors turned to the use of finitely additive measures. Also, the fact that
only the bargaining power of the coalitions can influence the final outcomes, has suggested to
work directly with coalitions themselves (Vind, 1964). After the one of Armstrong and Richter
(1984), many works have thus faced the problem of core-Walras equivalence in a coalitional finitely
additive setting (Basile, 1993; Donnini and Graziano, 2009). However, in all these models, when
the commodity space is of infinite dimension the non emptiness of the positive cone is directly
assumed.
The aim of our work is twofold: on the one hand, we introduce in a coalitional framework a con-
dition which plays the same role of the extremely desirable commodity assumption combined with
the additivity condition in individualistic models (Rustichini and Yannelis, 1991), thus allowing to
work with commodity spaces whose cone has possibly empty interior; on the other one, we obtain
a core-Walras equivalence theorem working in a finitely additive context. We emphasize that, in
the literature, there are other countably additive coalitional models that make use of properness-
like conditions in order to obtain core-Walras equivalence theorems. We recall the works of Zame
(1986), and the recent one of Greinecker and Podczeck (2013): the last one includes the case of all
Banach lattices, at the cost of strengthening some measure theoretic hypotheses. The fact that
properness-like assumptions are crucial in order to account for spaces whose positive cone has
empty interior is also well emphasized by the recent work of Bhowmik and Graziano (2015), who
made use precisely of the above mentioned conditions for individuals to extend classical Vind’s
Theorem (1972) to the case of an ordered Banach space whose positive cone may have empty
interior with the presence of atoms in the agents space.
We define the notion of coalitional extreme desirability, and we also replace the additivity con-
dition of Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) (see also Angeloni and Martellotti, 2007; Bhowmik and
Graziano, 2015) by a weaker condition that, contrary to the additivity condition, is in fact satis-
fied for instance by balls in Lp spaces, p ≥ 1. Then, after introducing a set of natural hypotheses
on coalitional preferences, we prove a finitely additive core-Walras equivalence theorem for an ex-
change economy with a Banach lattice of commodities with the Radon-Nikodym property (RNP),
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without any assumption on the interior of the positive orthant. We also show that, when the
commodity space is separable and has the RNP, Rustichini and Yannelis’s (1991) individualistic
Theorem 6.1 can be deduced from our coalitional result.
We point out that there is a huge variety of spaces of interest in economic models and that
satisfy the RNP (see Diestel and Uhl, 1977), among which all reflexive spaces. Furthermore, our
new condition is satisfied when one moves from a classical individualistic model to the derived
coalitional one, as in Armstrong and Richter (1984). The present paper also represents a first
preliminary step towards extensions to richer models.
In Section 2 we describe the model, recall some definitions and introduce the notion of coalitional
extreme desirability. In Section 3 we provide our finitely additive core-Walras equivalence result
under coalitional extreme desirability. Section 4 is devoted to the comparisons with Rustichini
and Yannelis’s (1991) result and with other coalitional models.
2 The model
Let (Ω,Σ) be a measurable space, where Σ is an algebra on Ω, and let P be a strongly nonatomic
finitely additive (f.a.) probability on it, that is, for every A ∈ Σ and every ε ∈ (0, 1) there exists
B ⊂ A, B ∈ Σ such that P (B) = εP (A) (see also Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao, 1983).
For example, if Ω = [0, 1) and Σ =
{
n⋃
i=1
[ai, bi) : [ai, bi) ∩ [aj , bj) = Ø, i 6= j, 0 ≤ ai < bi < 1
}
, the
Lebesgue measure on Σ is strongly nonatomic. 1
(Ω,Σ, P ) is the space of agents, and elements in Σ are referred to as coalitions. Σ+ denotes the
class of non-negligible coalitions.
Let X be a Banach lattice with the Radon-Nikodym property (RNP), with positive cone X+
representing the commodity space. By > we shall denote the vector order in X, that is, x > y if
x− y ∈ X+. The symbol ∆n denotes the set {(θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 θi = 1}.
A coalitional exchange economy E = ((Ω,Σ, P ), (F )F∈Σ, e) for (Ω,Σ, P ) and X, is described as
follows. An allocation is any f.a. measure m : Σ → X+ and, when m  P (in the ε − δ sense of
Bhaskara Rao and Bhaskara Rao, 1983), we shall refer to m as a consumption allocation.
M denotes the set of consumption allocations in ba(Σ, X+). A consumption allocation specifies
the way commodities x ∈ X+ are assigned to coalitions.
The initial endowment is an allocation e : Σ→ X+: e ≡ P that is, e P and P  e.
For any m ∈M, and for any coalition F ∈ Σ, we shall denote by m|F the vector measure defined
on Σ by m|F (E) = m(E ∩ F ), for every E ∈ Σ.
1Other two simple examples can be constructed in the following way. Let P be a f.a. and semiconvex measure
on a σ-algebra, and let A be its Stone algebra. Then, the measure P˜ corresponding to P , is strongly nonatomic
on A. Or, if P is f.a. and semiconvex on a σ-algebra, then P is strongly nonatomic on the algebra generated by a
filtering family (Ωt)t.
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A simple allocation is any allocation s of the form s =
q∑
i=1
yiP|Hi , where {Hi}i is a decomposition
of Ω.
In particular, for each x ∈ X+, we shall indicate by xP the uniform allocations xˆ of Cheng (1991).
The positive cone (X∗)+ of the norm dual of X represents the price space, and its elements x∗
are termed as prices. The value of a commodity x at price x∗ is given by the evaluation x∗(x).
For each coalition F ∈ Σ+, a preference relation F on M×M is assigned.
The following assumptions on preferences are natural for coalitional form economies.
(T) F is transitive and irreflexive.
(I) (I.i) If m1,m2 ∈M, and m2 F m1, then, for each subcoalition G ∈ Σ+, G ⊆ F,m2 G m1;
(I.ii) if m2 F m1,m2 G m1, then m2 F∪G m1, for each F,G ∈ Σ+.
(WM) (weak monotonicity) For any m ∈M and x ∈ X+ \ {0}, m+ xP Ω m.
(S) (selfishness) If m1,m2,m3 ∈ M, F ∈ Σ+ are such that m1|F = m2|F then [m3 F m1 ⇐⇒
m3 F m2] and [m1 F m3 ⇐⇒ m2 F m3].
(A) (availability) e(Ω)  0 (where the notation x  0 means that x∗(x) > 0 for every nonzero
price x∗ ∈ (X∗)+).
Assumptions (I), (S) and (A), and variants of (WM), have natural economic interpretations
and are common to most of coalitional finitely additive models (see Armstrong and Richter, 1984;
Basile, 1993; Basile and Graziano, 2001; Donnini and Graziano, 2009). Instead, some coalitional
models (e.g. Donnini and Graziano, 2009) do not assume transitivity of preferences. However, we
point out that transitivity is a standard assumption in countably additive coalitional models (see
for example Zame, 1986 and the recent work of Greinecker and Podczeck, 2013) as well as for the
coalitional models derived from individualistic ones (e.g. Armstrong and Richter, 1984), where
transitivity of coalitional preferences derives from that of individual preferences. Therefore, this
assumption does not appear too demanding.
It is easily seen that (WM) is implied by the usual monotonicity assumed in Armstrong and
Richter (1984).
Note that (WM), jointly with condition (T), implies the following weak form of transitivity
(WT), which should be compared with condition (V.3) in Cheng (1991):
(WT) if f Ω g and x ∈ X+ \ {0} then f + xP Ω g.
We also assume the following form of continuity:
(C) For every F ∈ Σ+, any α, β ∈M with β F α, and any τ > 0, there exist F0 ∈ Σ+, F0 ⊆ F ,
and ρ(τ) > 0 such that P (F \ F0) < τ and, for every simple allocation s with ‖s− β‖ < ρ,
s F0 α.
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Definition 2.1 m ∈M is feasible provided m(Ω) = e(Ω).
Denote by F the set of feasible allocations.
Given m1,m2 ∈M and F ∈ Σ+, we say that m1 blocks m2 via F if m1 F m2 and m1(F ) = e(F ).
α ∈ F is called a core allocation if no allocation m ∈M blocks α via any F ∈ Σ+.
α ∈ F is called a Walrasian allocation, if there is a nonzero price x∗ ∈ (X∗)+ such that, for each
coalition F ∈ Σ+, x∗(α(F )) ≤ x∗(e(F )), and x∗(β(F )) > x∗(e(F )) whenever β is a consumption
allocation with β F α. The pair (x∗, α) is called a Walrasian equilibrium.
We now extend the additivity condition as well as the notion of extreme desirability of Rustichini
and Yannelis (1991) to coalitional preferences, in the following way.
Definition 2.2 Coalitional preferences F are called proper if
(P) there are u ∈ X+, and an open, convex, solid neighborhood U of 0 in X, fulfilling the
following two conditions:
(P.i) there exists ϑ > 0 such that, for every n ∈ N, y1, . . . , yn ∈ X+ ∩ U c, and every
(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ ∆n, the vector
n∑
i=1
tiyi 6∈ ϑU ;
(P.ii) setting H =
⋃
t>0
t(u+ U), if y ∈ X+, t ∈ [0, 1], v ∈ X+ are such that z = (y+tu−v) ∈
(y +H) ∩X+, then zP Ω yP .
u is called an extremely desirable commodity with respect to U .
Let us briefly comment on these two properties.
Observe first that condition (P.ii) can be equivalently formulated in the more familiar form:
settingH =
⋃
t>0
t(u+ U), if y ∈ X+, t ∈ [0, 1], v ∈ X+ are such that z = (y + tu− v) ∈ (y +H) ∩X+,
then zP Ω yP (use for example Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Lemma 5.28 page 182).
Under this form, one immediately deduces that (P) is satisfied by the coalitional model derived
from an individualistic one, where individual preferences satisfy assumptions (A.10) and (A.11)
in Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), or the properness of Angeloni and Martellotti (2007).
Condition (P.i) replaces the so called additivity condition in Rustichini and Yannelis (1991); in
Angeloni and Martellotti (2007) it had been noted that the additivity condition can be equivalently
reformulated in the form : U c ∩X+ is convex, and another equivalent formulation, expressed in
terms of linear functionals and half-spaces thus determined, appears in Martellotti (2008).
The main advantage of the weaker form of the additivity condition (P.i) above, is that it is
immediately satisfied by the balls of some important spaces.
For instance, (P.i) holds if U = ρX1 (X1 denotes the unitary open ball) and X = L
p(T,A, µ) for
some measure space (T,A, µ) and p ≥ 1. In fact, if q is the conjugate exponent of p, then (P.i)
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holds with ϑ =
ρ
q
√
q
. By Schwartz’s inequality, for every (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ Rn+, one immediately has:
n∑
i=1
θi ≤ q√q p
√√√√ n∑
i=1
θpi .
Indeed, write
n∑
i=1
θi = θ · 1 as a scalar product between two vectors in Rn. Hence:
n∑
i=1
θi = θ · 1 ≤ ‖1‖q · ‖θ‖p = q√q p
√√√√ n∑
i=1
θpi .
Thus, if θ ∈ ∆n, then
n∑
i=1
θpi ≥
1
q
p
q
.
Then, as ‖yi‖p ≥ ρ one finds:∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
tiyi
∥∥∥∥∥
p
p
=
∫
A
(
n∑
i=1
tiyi
)p
dµ ≥
∫
A
(
n∑
i=1
tpi y
p
i
)
dµ =
n∑
i=1
tpi ‖yi‖pp ≥ ρp
n∑
i=1
tpi ≥
ρp
q
p
q
whence
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
tiyi
∥∥∥∥∥
p
≥ ρ
q
√
q
= ϑ.
Similarly, if X is a real Hilbert space, and again U = ρX1, then (P.i) is satisfied with ϑ =
1√
2
.
In fact, as in the above computation, one finds:∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
tiyi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
〈∑
tiyi,
∑
tiyi
〉
≥
∑
t2i ‖yi‖2 ≥ ρ2
∑
t2i ≥
ρ2
2
.
It should be underlined that the space L1(T,A, µ) does not enjoy however the RNP.
Finally, if (X+)◦ 6= Ø and coalitional preferences satisfy (WM), then (P.ii) is automatically
satisfied.
3 Main result
Coalitional extreme desirability allows us to prove core-Walras equivalence.
Before proving it, we recall a lemma from Martellotti (2007).
Lemma 3.1 Let P be a strongly nonatomic f.a. probability on an algebra Σ. Then, for every
ε > 0, and every finite decomposition of E, {E1, . . . E`} ⊆ Σ, there exists a decomposition of E,
say {F, F1, . . . , Fq}, such that P (F ) = P (E \
⋃
Fq) < ε, P (F1) = · · · = P (Fq), and {F1, . . . , Fq}
is finer than the corresponding decomposition of E \ F by {E1, . . . E`}.
Let now α be an allocation in the core. Define the set:
K =
⋃
F∈Σ+
[{γ(F ) : γ ∈M, γ F α} − e(F )] .
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By (WM), K is nonempty.
Moreover, consider the sets W = ϑU , with ϑ determined by (P.i), and C =
⋃
t>0
t(u+W ).
Lemma 3.2 K ∩ (−C) = Ø
Proof. Since −C is open, one can prove equivalently that K ∩ (−C) = Ø.
Let by contradiction z = γ(F )− e(F ) ∈ K ∩ (−C) be fixed, and take ε > 0 such that z + εX1 ⊂
(−C).
Let δ = δ
(ε
7
)
be determined by the absolute continuity of γ and e w.r.t. P . By (C), we can
choose τ = δ and determine F0 ⊆ F , F0 ∈ Σ+, with P (F \ F0) < τ , and the corresponding
ρ(τ) = ρ.
AsX has the RNP, we can choose a simple allocation s =
q∑
i=1
yiP|Fi , where {Fi}i is a decomposition
of F0, such that ‖γ − s‖ < min
{ε
7
, ρ
}
(see Uhl (1967)); thus s F0 α.
Now, setting z0 = s(F0)− e(F0), we obtain:
‖z0 − z‖ = ‖s(F0)− γ(F ) + e(F )− e(F0)‖ ≤ ‖s(F0)− γ(F0)‖+ ‖γ(F \ F0)‖+ ‖e(F \ F0)‖ < 3
7
ε.
Hence, s(F0)− e(F0) ∈ (−C), with s F0 α.
W.l.o.g. we can assume that P (F1) = · · · = P (Fn) = ξ. In fact, otherwise, applying Lemma 3.1
we can reduce to a subset F˜ ⊆ F0 with P (F0 \ F˜ ) < τ , and to a decomposition {E1, . . . , En} of F˜
with P (E1) = . . . = P (En) = ξ. Hence, consider z˜ = s(F˜ )− e(F˜ ). We get:
‖z− z˜‖ ≤ ‖z−z0‖+‖z0− z˜‖ ≤ 3
7
ε+‖s(F0)−γ(F0)‖+‖γ(F0\F˜ )‖+‖γ(F˜ )−s(F˜ )‖+‖e(F0\F˜ )‖ < ε
and so, s(F˜ )− e(F˜ ) ∈ (−C), with s 
F˜
α.
Therefore, s(F0)− e(F0) ∈ −t(u+W ) for some t > 0, that means:
q∑
i=1
yiξ − e(F0) = −t(u+ v0) (1)
for some v0 ∈W , or else:
q∑
i=1
yi + w − v = e(F0)
ξ
∈ X+
where w =
t
ξ
u, v = − t
ξ
v0 ∈ t
ξ
W .
As in Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), we can choose w.l.o.g. that v ∈ X+.
Again, similarly to the proof in Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), for every choice of (t1, . . . , tq) ∈ ∆q,
one finds with the Riesz Decomposition Property of X, v1, . . . vq ∈ X+ with v1 + . . .+ vq = v and
yi + tiw > vi, i = 1, . . . , q.
Set now H =
⋃
t>0
t(u+ U), and remember that (u, U) is a properness pair.
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Define di : [0, 1]→ R as di(t) = dist [yi + tw − vi, (yi +H) ∩X+], and f : ∆q → ∆q as:
f(t1, . . . , tq) =
(
ti + di(ti)
1 +
∑q
i=1 di(ti)
)
i=1,...,q
and let (t1, . . . , tq) be a fixed point:
ti
q∑
i=1
di(ti) = di(ti).
We claim that
q∑
i=1
di(ti) > 0.
Suppose by contradiction that di(ti) = 0 for each i = 1, . . . , q, that is:
(yi + tiw − vi) ∈ (yi +H) ∩X+ ⊆ (yi +H) ∩X+;
then, by (P.ii) and (I.i), (yi + tiw − vi)P Fi yiP and, by (I.ii) and (T), we have:
q∑
i=1
(yi + tiw − vi)P|Fi F0 s F0 α.
Set now s0 =
q∑
i=1
(yi + tiw − vi)P|Fi + α|Ω\F0 . Then, s0 F0 α. But, from (1), also s0(F0) = e(F0);
therefore s0 blocks α via F0, which contradicts the assumption that α is in the core.
Then, we turn to the case
q∑
i=1
di(ti) > 0.
Although pretty similar to that in Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), we include some details here, to
show how the weaker formulation of the additivity condition (this is the unique point where it has
been used in Rustichini and Yannelis, 1991) still leads to a contradiction. In fact, for those indices
i for which di(ti) = 0, one has necessarily that ti = 0 too and, conversely, if ti = 0, then di(ti) = 0.
Hence, we can split {1, . . . , q} into I = {i : di(ti) = 0} = {i : ti = 0} and J = {1, . . . , q} \ I.
For i ∈ I, necessarily vi = 0; in fact, if vi 6= 0 one would find that:
yi > yi − vi = yi + tiw − vi
and yi − vi 6= yi, whence, by (WM), yiP Ω (yi − vi)P .
But this leads to the conclusion that (yi − vi) 6∈ (yi +H)∩X+ for otherwise, because of (P), the
converse (yi − vi)P Ω yiP should hold.
Therefore, di(ti) > 0 for i ∈ I, a contradiction to the very definition of I.
Hence, v =
q∑
i=1
vi =
∑
i∈J
vi.
For i ∈ J , as di(ti) > 0, necessarily (yi+ tiw−vi) 6∈ X+ ∩ (yi +H) and, since (yi+ tiw−vi) ∈ X+
(for yi ∈ X+ and we have chosen vi 6 yi + tiw), a fortiori tiw − vi 6∈ H, i.e. ti t
ξ
u− vi 6∈ H.
Thus, vi 6∈ ti · t
ξ
U for i ∈ J , and
∑
i∈J
ti = 1.
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Hence,
ξ
t
· vi
ti
6∈ U ; by virtue of (P.i):
∑
i∈J
ti · ξ
t
· vi
ti
=
ξ
t
∑
i∈J
vi =
ξ
t
v 6∈ ϑU
which precisely contradicts the original assumption that v =
t
ξ
v0 ∈ t
ξ
W =
t
ξ
ϑU .
Hence K ∩ (−C) =Ø. 2
Lemma 3.3 K is convex.
Proof. Fix z1, z2 ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1); to prove that zλ = λz1 + (1− λ)z2 ∈ K we have to prove that,
for each ε > 0, there exists ξ ∈ K with ‖zλ − ξ‖ < ε
2
.
Since zi ∈ K, there are allocations γi, i = 1, 2 and coalitions Fi, i = 1, 2: γi Fi α and:
‖γi(Fi)− e(Fi)− zi‖ < ε.
By (C), after determining δ through the absolute continuity of γi, i = 1, 2 and e w.r.t. P , choose
τ = δ
( ε
12
)
, and determine ρi = ρi(τ), and Ei ⊆ Fi, Ei ∈ Σ+ with P (Fi \ Ei) ≤ τ , i = 1, 2. Set
ρ = min{ρ1, ρ2}. As previously, we can replace γ1, γ2, e by means of simple allocations s1, s2, η:
‖si − γi‖ < min
{ ε
12
, ρ
}
, ‖e− η‖ < ε
12
and si Ei α.
Also, since s1, s2, η are simple, we can rearrange them on a common decomposition D and,
by means of suitable refinements, D can be represented as D = D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3, where D1 =
{G1, . . . , Gn} is a decomposition of E1\E2, D2 = {H1, . . . ,Hp} of E1∩E2 and D3 = {K1, . . . ,Kq}
of E2 \ E1.
By the nonatomicity of P , we can find in each Gi a subset Gi,λ such that P (Gi,λ) = λP (Gi) and,
analogously, a subset Kj,(1−λ) ⊂ Kj with P (Kj,(1−λ)) = (1− λ)P (Kj); finally each H` splits into
H`,λ, H` \H`,λ with P (H`,λ) = λP (H`), P (H` \H`,λ) = (1− λ)P (H`).
Consider now:
S1 =
n⋃
i=1
Gi,λ ⊂ E1 \ E2, S2 =
p⋃
`=1
H`,λ ⊂ E1 ∩ E2,
S3 =
p⋃
`=1
H` \H`,λ ⊂ E1 ∩ E2, S4 =
q⋃
j=1
Kj,(1−λ) ⊂ E2 \ E1.
Note that S2 ∩ S3 =Ø.
Also, (s1 − η)(S1 ∪ S2) = λ(s1 − η)(E1) and (s2 − η)(S3 ∪ S4) = (1− λ)(s2 − η)(E2).
Moreover, s11S1∪S2 S1∪S2 α and s21S3∪S4 S3∪S4 α, whence:
s11S1∪S2 + s21S3∪S4 S1∪...∪S4 α.
Hence:
s1(S1 ∪ S2) + s2(S3 ∪ S4)− e(S1 ∪ . . . ∪ S4) ∈ K.
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But:
‖(s1−η)(S1∪S2)−λz1‖ ≤ λ(‖(s1−η)(E1)−(γ1−e)(E1)‖+‖(γ1(F1\E1)−e(F1\E1))‖+‖z1−(γ1−e)(E1)‖) ≤ 5
6
λε
and, similarly:
‖(s2 − η)(S3 ∪ S4)− (1− λ)z2‖ ≤ 5
6
(1− λ)ε.
Furthermore,
‖(s1 − e)(S1 ∪ S2)− (s1 − η)(S1 ∪ S2)‖ < ε
12
, ‖(s2 − e)(S3 ∪ S4)− (s2 − η)(S3 ∪ S4)‖ < ε
12
so
‖s1(S1 ∪ S2) + s2(S3 ∪ S4)− e(S1 ∪ . . . ∪ S4)− zλ‖ ≤ ε
6
+
5
6
λε+
5
6
(1− λ)ε = ε.
2
Theorem 3.1 Under assumptions (T), (I), (WM), (S), (A), (C), (P), α is in the core if and
only if α is a Walrasian allocation.
Proof. As usual, it is straightforward to prove that every Walrasian allocation is in the core.
To prove the converse inclusion, note that, from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3, since −C is open
we can strictly separate K and −C by means of a nonzero linear functional x∗ ∈ X∗, namely we
can find a nonzero x∗ ∈ X∗, t ∈ R:
x∗(x) ≥ t > x∗(y), x ∈ K, y ∈ −C.
Since 0 ∈ K ∩ (−C), necessarily t = 0; hence x∗(x) ≥ 0 on K. x∗ is therefore positive, since
X+ \ {0} ⊂ K.
It remains to prove that (x∗, α) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Consider the allocation α + εxP , with ε > 0, x ∈ X+ \ {0}. Using (WM) and (I.i), we deduce
x∗(α(F )+εxP (F )−e(F )) ≥ 0, for each F ∈ Σ+; hence, if x∗(x) = 0 we have x∗(α(F )) ≥ x∗(e(F )),
otherwise, if x∗(x) > 0, letting ε ↓ 0 we get x∗(α(F )) ≥ x∗(e(F )), for each F ∈ Σ+. Furthermore,
if x∗(α(F )) > x∗(e(F )), for some F ∈ Σ+, then x∗(α(Ω)) = x∗(α(F ))+x∗(α(Ω\F )) > x∗(e(F ))+
x∗(e(Ω\F )) = x∗(e(Ω)), contradicting the feasibility of α. Hence, x∗(α(F )) = x∗(e(F )), for every
F ∈ Σ+.
Now let F ∈ Σ+ and β ∈ M: β F α. It is then impossible that x∗(β(F )) < x∗(e(F )). Suppose
x∗(β(F )) = x∗(e(F )).
Now two cases can occur:
(I) x∗(β(F )) > 0. Then, by β  P and the continuity of x∗, there exists τ > 0 such that each
F0 ∈ Σ+, F0 ⊆ F with P (F \ F0) < τ has x∗(β(F0)) > 0. By (I.i), on each such F0 we have
β F0 α.
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Applying (C), corresponding to the above τ , we determine ρ(τ) > 0 and F0 ⊆ F, F0 ∈ Σ+ (with
P (F \ F0) < τ), such that β F0 α. Let now s be a simple allocation, s =
∑
xiP |Fi such that
‖s − β‖ < ρ
3
, where {Fi}i is a decomposition of F0. Then, s F0 α and at least one of the Fi’s
has strictly positive x∗β - measure. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that it is F1. We can
as well assume that 0 < P (F1) < 1 (otherwise, by the nonatomicity of P , we can split F1 into
F 11 , F
2
1 , with P (F
1
1 ) = P (F
2
1 ) =
1
2
P (F1), and substitute x11F1 with x11F 11 +x11F 21 .) Now, we can
choose G1 ∈ Σ+, G1 ⊆ F1 such that:
P (G1)‖x1‖ ≤ ρ
3
;
x∗β(G1)
P (G1)
≥ x
∗β(F1)
P (F1)
.
Notice that such a set exists, since the range of the 2-valued measure (P, x∗β) has convex closure,
i.e. its closure is a zonoid (see the Appendix for a detailed explanation).
Consider now σ = β(F1)P|G1 + s|Ω\G1 . We have:
‖s− σ‖ = ‖β(F1)− x1‖P (G1) ≤ ‖β(F1)− x1P (F1)‖+ ‖x1‖(1− P (F1))P (G1) <
<
ρ
3
+ ‖x1‖(1− P (F1))P (G1) < 2
3
ρ.
Hence, ‖σ − β‖ < ρ, and so σ F0 α. For γ = σ|G1 + β|Ω\G1 , it holds γ F α, therefore
γ(F )− e(F ) ∈ K. So,
x∗(e(F )) ≤ x∗(γ(F )) = x∗(σ(G1)) + x∗(β(F \G1)) =
= x∗(β(F1))P (G1) + x∗(β(F ))− x∗(β(G1)) = x∗(β(F )) + x∗[β(F1)P (G1)− β(G1)].
As P (F1) < 1, we have
x∗β(G1)
P (G1)
≥ x
∗β(F1)
P (F1)
> x∗β(F1), and so the previous inequalities yield
x∗(e(F )) ≤ x∗(γ(F )) < x∗(β(F )) = x∗(e(F )), thus we have reached a contradiction.
(II) x∗(β(F )) = 0
In this case, x∗(e(F )) = 0. Take the allocation γ = α+e(F )P . Since, by the equivalence of e and P ,
we have that e(F ) ∈ X+ \ {0}, by (WM) it holds γ Ω α and x∗(γ(Ω)) = x∗(α(Ω)) +x∗(e(F )) =
x∗(e(Ω)).
So, by (A), we are again in the conditions of case (I) above, namely, the allocation γ and the
grand coalition Ω can play the role of β and F of the previous case to lead us to a contradiction.
2
Remark 3.1 Our core-Walras equivalence theorem also holds when P is nonatomic and Σ is an
algebra with the Seever property (that is, if {An} is an increasing sequence and {Bn} a decreasing
sequence of sets in Σ, with An ⊂ Bn, for every n, there is a C ∈ Σ such that An ⊂ C ⊂ Bn for all
n) as Lemma 3.1 can be proved under these hypotheses as well.
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Remark 3.2 In coalitional models, it is standard to work with cone M of allocations (see, for
example, Armstrong and Richter, 1984; Cheng, 1991). According to one referee’s suggestion, We
want to point out that, in our case, the proof line can also be applied to the case of any Banach
lattice X, provided the class M of allocations is bounded to integral allocations, (namely those
allocations admitting a density in L1X(P )). This would hence allow also L
1 as commodity space.
Remark 3.3 Notice that Theorem 3.1 can also be proved, ceteris paribus, assuming the follow-
ing weaker form of continuity in place of (C):
(C∗) Let F ∈ Σ+, and α, β ∈M with β F α. Then, for every τ > 0, there exists ρ(τ) > 0 such
that, for every simple allocation s with ‖s− β‖ < ρ, there exists F0 = F0(s) ∈ Σ+, F0 ⊆ F ,
with P (F \ F0) < τ and s F0 α.
together with the standard continuity assumption (see, for example, Greinecker and Podczeck,
2013):
(C∗∗) For every F ∈ Σ+, any α, β ∈ M with β F α, and any τ > 0, there exists ε ∈ (0, 1) and
F0 ∈ Σ+, F0 ⊆ F , such that P (F \ F0) < τ and εβ F0 α.
Indeed, it is immediate to get convinced that assumption (C∗) is enough to prove Lemma 3.2 and
Lemma 3.3, while assumption (C∗∗) can be used to do the final step of Theorem 3.1 in order to
show that (x∗, α) is a Walrasian equilibrium, namely, to prove that if F ∈ Σ+, and β F α, then
x∗(β(F )) > x∗(e(F )).
In fact, take F ∈ Σ+ and β ∈ M : β F α. It is impossible that x∗(β(F )) < x∗(e(F )). Suppose
then that x∗(β(F )) = x∗(e(F )). Suppose first that x∗(β(F )) > 0. By (C∗∗), for some ε ∈ (0, 1)
and F0 ⊆ F , F0 ∈ Σ+, we have εβ F0 α. Moreover, by β  P and the continuity of x∗, F0 can be
taken so that x∗(β(F0)) > 0. So, setting γ = εβ|F0 + β|F\F0 , by (I) and (S), we get γ F α, and
hence γ(F ) − e(F ) ∈ K. So x∗(e(F )) ≤ x∗(γ(F )) = x∗(β(F )) + (ε − 1)x∗(β(F0)) < x∗(β(F )) =
x∗(e(F )), a contradiction. Using (A), the case x∗(β(F )) = 0 can now be treated exactly as case
(II) in the last part of Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.4 If one takes M to be the cone of simple allocations, Theorem 3.1 can be proved
by replacing hypothesis (C) with (C∗∗). In fact, in this case, the continuity assumption needs to
be used just in the last part of the proof, namely, to prove that (x∗, α) is a Walrasian equilibrium,
and this follows from exactly the same line of the previous remark.
Remark 3.5 As for the comparison with other coalitional finitely additive models, in most of
the coalitional literature in such a setting, the separation argument is deduced from the assump-
tion that the interior of X+ is nonempty (Vind, 1964; Armstrong and Richter, 1984; Basile and
Graziano, 2001). To our knowledge, the only papers attempting to avoid this assumption are
Cheng (1991) and Donnini and Graziano (2009). In both of these papers the commodity spaces
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are not Banach lattices. Moreover, in the first one, the author makes use of a sort of properness
(conditions (V.1)-(V.3)) that we can not compare to ours, because the consumption set in Cheng
(1991) is the whole space X. Also, in Donnini and Graziano (2009), the authors suggest a con-
dition surrogating the nonemptiness of the interior of the cone, the so defined (K-V) condition.
However, in this case, one can not dispense from involving the production set and, therefore, as
the authors themselves mentioned, the result is not applicable to pure exchange economies.
4 Comprehensiveness and countably additive case
We now show that, when X is separable and has the RNP, and countable additivity is assumed,
our result, under the hypotheses discussed in Remark 3.3, covers the individualistic core-Walras
equivalence theorem of Rustichini and Yannelis (1991). The translation of the individualistic
model into the coalitional one is the standard one of Armstrong and Richter (1984).
Proposition 4.1 Assumptions (A.5.) and (A.7.) of Theorem 6.1 of Rustichini and Yannelis
(1991) imply assumptions (C∗) and (C∗∗).
Proof. Take α ∈ M where α =
∫
adP , with a : Ω −→ X+. Then, by (A.7.) of Rustichini
and Yannelis (1991), the set Γ(ω) =
{
x ∈ X+ : x ω a(ω)
}
is measurable, for every ω ∈ Ω. Take
E ∈ Σ+, and β =
∫
bdP ∈ M, β E α, that is, b(ω) ω a(ω), P -a.e. in E. From (A.5.) of
Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), there exists ρ(ω) > 0 such that b(ω) + ρ(ω)X1 ⊂ Γ(ω), P -a.e. in
E.
We claim that ω 7→ ρ(ω) can be taken to be measurable. Indeed, as X is separable, the multi-
function defined by G(ω) = X+ \ Γ(ω) is measurable (Riecaˇn and Neubrunn, 1997, page 261),
and so it is also weakly measurable. As Γ(ω) is open and b(ω) ∈ Γ(ω), P -a.e. in E, it holds
d(b(ω), G(ω)) > 0, P -a.e. in E. Notice that G(ω) is complete; hence, by Theorem III.7 page 66
of Castaing and Valadier (1977), there exists a sequence {gn}n of measurable selections of G such
that G(ω) = {gn(ω), n ∈ N}. Hence, d(b(ω), G(ω)) = infn ‖b(ω) − gn(ω)‖, so ω 7→ d(b(ω), G(ω))
is measurable and the same holds for ω 7→ 1
2
d(b(ω), G(ω)). Hence, define ρ(ω) =
1
2
d(b(ω), G(ω))
and notice that ρ(ω) > 0 and b(ω) + ρ(ω)X1 ⊂ Γ(ω), as ρ(ω) < d(b(ω), G(ω)) and, if y ∈ X+ is
such that ‖b(ω)− y‖ < ρ(ω), then y /∈ G(ω) and so y ∈ Γ(ω).
Consider now En =
{
ω ∈ E : ρ(ω) > 1
n
}
. We have P (En)→ P (E).
Fix 0 < τ < 2P (E), and choose n such that
1
n
<
τ
2
and P (E \ En) < τ
2
.
Set now ρ(τ) =
1
n2
, and let s be a simple allocation such that ‖s− β‖ < 1
n2
, that is,
∫
Ω
∥∥∥∥ dsdP − b
∥∥∥∥ dP < 1n2 .
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Then, for H =
{
ω ∈ E :
∥∥∥∥ dsdP (ω)− b(ω)
∥∥∥∥ > 1n
}
, it holds P (H) ≤ 1
n
. Set F = En \H: we have
E \ F = (E \En) ∪H, and hence P (E \ F ) ≤ τ
2
+
1
n
< τ . Notice that n can be chosen in such a
way that P (En) >
τ
2
. Hence, as P (H) ≤ 1
n
, then P (F ) = P (En)− P (En ∩H) > τ
2
− 1
n
> 0. So,
F 6= Ø.
As F ⊂ En, then, for ω ∈ F , ρ(ω) > 1
n
and, as F ∩H = Ø, then
∥∥∥∥ dsdP (ω)− b(ω)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1n . Hence,∥∥∥∥ dsdP (ω)− b(ω)
∥∥∥∥ < ρ(ω) and so, dsdP (ω) ∈ Γ(ω), P -a.e. in F , that is, s F α. Hence, (C∗) holds.
Fix now τ > 0, and choose an n such that:
P ({ω ∈ E : ‖b(ω)‖ > n}) < τ
2
and
P
({
ω ∈ E : ρ(ω) ≤ 1
n
})
<
τ
2
.
Take F = E\(A1∪A2), where A1 = {ω ∈ E : ‖b(ω)‖ > n}, and A2 =
{
ω ∈ E : ρ(ω) ≤ 1
n
}
. Then,
P (E \F ) < τ and, for ω ∈ F , b(ω) + 1
n
X1 ⊂ Γ(ω). Take ε ∈
(
1− 1
n2
, 1
)
, and consider εβ. Then,
pointwise in F , one has ‖b(ω)− εb(ω)‖ = (1− ε)‖b(ω)‖. Then, ‖b(ω)− εb(ω)‖ < 1
n2
‖b(ω)‖ ≤ 1
n
,
so εb(ω) ∈ b(ω) + 1
n
X1 ⊂ Γ(ω), whence εb(ω) ω a(ω) in F , therefore εβ F α, and so (C∗∗) is
proved. 2
It is now routine to show that the assumptions of Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) imply all our
other coalitional assumptions, provided the initial endowment in their model has P -a.e. non-zero
values. Hence, for separable commodity spaces with the RNP, our theorem covers their Theorem
6.1.
We now shortly compare the result in Section 3 with other countably additive coalitional core-
Walras equivalence theorems existing in the literature. A deeper investigation is postponed to a
future work.
(a) The validity of Proposition 4.1 above is deeply dependent on the assumption of the sep-
arability of the space X: this precludes the comparison with results such as Corollary 4 in
Evren and Hu¨sseinov (2008).
(b) Zame (1986) proved a coalitional core-Walras equivalence result in the countably additive
setting (Theorem 2). Although his result can not be deduced directly from Theorem 3.1
when X enjoys the RNP, it is worthwhile to mention that a similar result can be proved
along the same lines of our proof, actually without the requirement that e has relatively
compact range (if we assume a countably additive setting, relative compactness of the range
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follows directly from the nonatomicity of P , the absolute continuity of e w.r.t. P , and
Theorem 10, page 266 in Diestel and Uhl, 1977). In fact, (C-1) - (C-5) of Zame either
coincide or imply (T), (I), (S) and (WM), and (P) can replace (C-9). Indeed, according
to the statement of the author, the individualistic analogous of assumption (C9) is “quite
a bit stronger” than Mas Colell’s (1986) properness (hence than Rustichini and Yannelis’s,
1991, condition). Moreover, conditions (C-6) and (C-8) can be used to prove the initial
part of Lemma 3.2 as well as Lemma 3.3.
(c) Zame’s framework has been recently reconsidered by Greinecker and Podczeck (2013); as
in our work, their aim is to significantly extend the class of Banach lattices on which a
coalitional core-Walras equivalence result holds. However, the point of view of the two
approaches is substantially different. While we offer an approach adapted to a new class
of possible Banach lattices, their effort is based on the idea of completely abandoning any
requirement on the commodity space, and to focus on the measure theoretic properties of
the space of agents and on a strengthening of the nonatomicity notion of the probability P .
The models also differ in some of the assumptions on preferences: indeed, their assumption
(P.7) is implied by our (C), when M is the cone of simple allocations, while we have both
a weaker monotonicity and a “quite weaker”properness-like assumption (they assume (C9)
of Zame, 1986). We think that, one of the appealing features of our approach, is the easiness
in detecting whether a Banach lattice enjoys the RNP (see Diestel and Uhl, 1977, pages
217-219).
(c) In the countably additive case, the proof of the convexity of the set K can be shortened and
given analogously to Armstrong and Richter (1984), Lemma 4, in the following way.
Lemma 4.1 K is convex.
Proof. Fix z1, z2 ∈ K, t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1] such that t1 + t2 = 1; to prove that z = t1z1 + t2z2 ∈ K,
we have to prove that, for each ε > 0, there exists ξ ∈ K with ‖z − ξ‖ < ε.
Since zi ∈ K, there are allocations γi, i = 1, 2 and coalitions Fi,i = 1, 2: γi Fi α and
‖γi(Fi)− e(Fi)− zi‖ < ε
14
.
Let δ > 0 be determined by γi, e  P , i = 1, 2 and, by (C), choose τ = δ
( ε
14
)
, and
determine ρ(τ) = min{ρ1(τ), ρ2(τ)}. As in Lemma 3.3, we can replace γ1, γ2 by means
of simple allocations s1, s2: ‖si − γi‖ < ε
14
and si Gi α, where Gi ∈ Σ+, Gi ⊆ Fi and
P (Fi \Gi) < τ . Now, from si  P and e P , it follows that each si and e are nonatomic
and so, as X has the RNP, the range of si and e have convex closure (see Uhl, (1969)) Hence,
as in Armstrong and Richter, (1984), Lemma 4, we can choose two disjoint measurable sets
E1 ⊆ G1 and E2 ⊆ G2, such that ‖si(Ei) − tisi(Gi)‖ < ε
14
and ‖e(Ei) − tie(Gi)‖ < ε
14
,
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i = 1, 2. Define the allocation s as the allocation which equals si on Ei, i = 1, 2, and e
outside E1∪E2. Let E = E1∪E2. Hence s E α, therefore ξ = s(E)−e(E) ∈ K. Moreover,
an easy computation shows that ‖s(E)− e(E)− (t1z1 + t2z2)‖ < ε.
Indeed, ‖s(E)−e(E)− (t1z1 + t2z2)‖ = ‖s1(E1)+s2(E2)−e(E1)−e(E2)− (t1z1 + t2z2)‖ ≤
‖s1(E1)− e(E1)− t1z1‖+ ‖s2(E2)− e(E2)− t2z2)‖=
‖s1(E1)− e(E1)− t1z1− t1(s1(G1)− e(G1)) + t1(s1(G1)− e(G1))‖+‖s2(E2)− e(E2)− t2z2−
t2(s2(G2)− e(G2)) + t2(s2(G2)− e(G2))‖ ≤
‖s1(E1)− t1s1(G1)‖+ t1‖s1(G1)− e(G1)− z1‖+ ‖t1e(G1)− e(E1)‖+
‖s2(E2)− t2s2(G2)‖+ t2‖s2(G2)− e(G2)− z2‖+ ‖t2e(G2)− e(E2)‖.
But ‖si(Gi)− e(Gi)− zi‖ ≤
‖si(Fi)− γi(Fi)‖+ ‖γi(Fi)− e(Fi)− zi‖+ ‖si(Fi \Gi)− γi(Fi \Gi)‖
+ ‖e(Fi \Gi))‖+ ‖γi(Fi \Gi))‖ ≤ 5
14
ε, i = 1, 2. 2
Appendix A.
In this Appendix we will give an explanation of the fact that, in Theorem 3.1 it is possible to
choose G1 ∈ Σ+, G1 ⊆ F1 such that:
P (G1)‖x1‖ ≤ ρ
3
;
x∗β(G1)
P (G1)
≥ x
∗β(F1)
P (F1)
.
Since we are assuming that P is strongly nonatomic, P satisfies the Darboux Property, that is for
every τ > 0 and every E ∈ Σ one can decompose E into finitely many disjoint Σ-measurable sets,
each with probability P less than τ .
All allocations are assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to P in the ε−δ-sense; hence
x∗β will also fulfill the Darboux Property. Since x∗ is a positive functional, we are reasoning on
a R2+-valued finitely additive measure on an algebra Σ.
By means of a Stone argument (see Dunford-Schwartz ”Linear Operator” I.12.1 page 40) Σ is
transformed into a pure algebra (i.e. contaninig no countable unions), the Stone algebra, where
therefore P and x∗β transfer to countably additive measures which we shall denote by P˜ and x˜∗β.
By a standard argument in measure theory, one can extend each of these two set functions to a
non negative measure on the generated σ-algebra, and this measure will authomatically inherit
the Darboux Property; let us denote by
˜˜
P and x˜∗β these two further extensions.
Now we are in a countably additive setting, where all forms of nonatomicity are equivalent.
The Lyapunov Theorem then implies that the range of the pair
(˜˜
P , x˜∗β
)
is a zonoid, that is, a
closed convex subset of the positive orthant which is contains the origin and is symmetric w.r.t
the middle point of the line joining the origin with
(˜˜
P (Ω), (x˜∗β)(Ω)
)
.
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Furthermore, we know that the image under
(
P˜ , x˜∗β
)
of the Stone algebra is dense in this zonoid,
as well as we know that the image of the Stone algebra under
(
P˜ , x˜∗β
)
precisely coincides with
the range of (P, x∗β).
In conclusion the image of Σ under the pair (P, x∗β) is dense in a zonoid of R2.
The above argument can be analogously applied to the coalition F1 instead of the whole grand
coalition Ω.
Hence the image of the trace algebra ΣF1 under the pair (P, x
∗β) is dense in a form of the type
in the following picture, where the endpoint P has coordinates (P (F1), x
∗β(F1)).
Now it is enough to note that the ratios involved in the inequality:
x∗β(G1)
P (G1)
≥ x
∗β(F1)
P (F1)
represent the slope of the segments joining O with Q, if Q = (P (G1), x
∗β(G1)), and O with P .
Hence the two requirements simply reduce to finding a set on the upper part of the leaf, so that
the slope of the joining segment is greater than that of the diagonal, and with first coordinate
P (G1) small enough.
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